Sibling Separation: How Can We Preserve These Relationships? by Goth-Owens, Amanda
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Student Scholarship
1-1-2002
Sibling Separation: How Can We Preserve These
Relationships?
Amanda Goth-Owens
Michigan State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Amanda Goth-Owens, Sibling Separation: How Can We Preserve These Relationships? (2002),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king/21
SIBLING SEPARATION: HOW CAN WE PRESERVE THESE RELATIONSHIPS? 
AMANDA GOTH-OWENS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What happens to families when parents are deemed unfit or are no longer 
able to care for their children?  Often the children are taken from their families 
and placed in foster care and if efforts at reunification fail, these children are 
released for adoption.  Often overlooked in these situations is the fact that these 
children rarely enter the system alone; sibling groups are extremely common.  
While many courts and social service agencies attempt to keep these children 
together, sibling groups are frequently separated into different foster families and 
adoptive families never to see one another again.  In fact, in 1994 alone there 
were approximately 35,000 siblings placed in different out-of-home placements.  
This represents around forty percent of all sibling groups.1  Current federal law 
often frustrates the ability of social workers and courts to keep sibling groups 
together.  The Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (FAACWA) 
requires that permanent planning be the center of the child protection and has 
shortened the time within which reunification must occur from three years to one 
year, resulting in an increase in parental termination cases.  Further, this law lists 
adoption as the preferred permanent plan, which causes problems for sibling 
groups, because there are not enough adoptive homes that are willing to adopt 
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groups of siblings.2 This paper will review the harm that these children suffer as a 
result of being separated from their siblings, their current legal rights with respect 
to siblings, and the role that social workers, lawyers, and child advocates should 
play in situations of sibling separation, and finally, in the event that children are 
separated, proposals for ensuring that they can maintain contact with one 
another. 
IMPACT ON CHILDREN OF SEPARATION FROM SIBLINGS 
Historically, the emotionally well being of children was largely ignored.  
Children were thought to be quite malleable and adaptable and it was assumed 
that they were more able to forget or overcome traumatic events than adults 
were.  However, we are now beginning to realize that bonds formed in very early 
childhood are extremely important to social functioning throughout the life of an 
individual.   
Children who enter foster care are already at a disadvantage.  In most 
cases they have been removed from their parents because their parents were 
abusive or neglectful.  Despite the abuse and neglect, most of these children 
have bonded to their parents and are severely traumatized by being taken from 
their homes and parents.  When they are further separated from the rest of their 
family members (brothers and sisters) their anxiety is compounded. 
Aside from the parent child relationship, the sibling relationship is said to 
be the most important relationship in a child’s development.3  As noted 
psychologist Michael D. Kahn stated, “The sibling relationship is too valuable to 
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ignore.  It is the longest lasting relationship of a person’s life.  It outlasts 
relationships with parents and spouses.  It’s a relationship that’s too valuable to 
lose out on.”4  Siblings play an important role in socializing one another.  
Psychologists have found: “from these social interactions, the child develops a 
foundation for later learning and personality development.  Experiences in the 
areas of sex-role, moral, motor, and language development are all found in the 
context of social interactions.”5 
Additionally, studies on attachment demonstrate that the sibling bond may 
be as important in childhood development as the bond between parent and child.  
“Attachment research offers a rich empirical basis for evaluating the nature and 
importance of bonding.  Attachment describes an enduring emotional bond 
manifest by efforts to be in close proximity, especially in times of stress.”6  Self-
esteem, capacity for intimacy, basic trust in relationships, and adaptivity 
throughout adult life are all characteristics that are founded upon early childhood 
attachments.7  When children do not form these basic attachments early in life, 
the result may be disastrous for the individual and their ability to function in 
society.  Studies show that individuals who were deprived of these attachments 
are “disproportionally represented among the ranks of the unemployed, the 
mentally ill, drug abusers, and criminals.”8 
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Although the majority of these studies were based on the attachment 
between parents and children, it is important to note that in families with a great 
deal of instability, such as those where children must be removed to foster care, 
younger children may form a primary bond with an older sibling.  Sibling bonds 
are of further importance when children encounter the stress of being severed 
from their biological parents.  Children under this type of stress may form a sub-
family with one child assuming parental responsibility for others.9  As a result, for 
these children, the sibling bond is actually even stronger than the bond between 
the child and the parent.  These ties are further strengthened when the children 
are placed in a new situation, such as foster care.  “They may cling together to 
reduce some of the overwhelming strangeness.”10  
Children separated from their siblings may have lifelong feelings of loss 
and depression that are never resolved.  More siblings separated from their 
natural families search for their biological siblings than search for their birth 
parents.  Additionally, one of the main reasons that children report for running 
away from their foster families is to see their biological siblings.11 
Even courts have noted the importance of the sibling bond, in the opinion 
Obey v. Degling, 337 N.E.2d 601(N.Y. 1975), the judge noted, “Young brothers 
and sisters need each other’s strengths and association in their everyday and 
often common experiences, and to separate them, unnecessarily, is likely to be 
traumatic and harmful.  The importance of rearing brothers and sisters together 
and thereby nourishing their familial bonds is also strengthened by the likelihood 
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that the parents will pass away before their children.  In the final analysis, when 
these children become adults, they will have only each other to depend on.”12  
In another opinion, In Re Patricia A.W. 89 Misc. 2d 368 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1977), the court stated, “Surely, nothing can equal or replace either the emotional 
and biological bonds which exist between siblings, or the memories of trials and 
tribulations endured together, brotherly or sisterly quarrels and reconciliations, 
and the sharing of secrets, fears and dreams.  To be able to establish and 
nurture such a relationship is, without question, a natural, inalienable right which 
is bestowed upon one merely by virtue of birth into the same family.”13 
In short, it appears that psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, 
researchers, and courts are all in agreement that siblings are important to one 
another.  In light of this agreement, why then are 35,000 siblings separated 
annually?  The answer lies in the legal rights afforded to children as siblings or 
the lack thereof.  Often, financial and legal issues overwhelm the courts and the 
goal of keeping siblings together falls by the wayside.   
SIBLINGS’ CURRENT LEGAL RIGHTS 
 There is no doubt that the issue of siblings’ rights has come to the 
legal forefront in the last decade. For example, in 1999, state legislators 
considered sibling visitation, siblings’ desire to locate one another after 
separation, tax advantages for sisters and brothers who care for siblings, 
expedited termination of parental rights, and siblings’ rights to recover personal 
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injury and wrongful death damages.14 Additionally, five states now have laws that 
specifically grant standing to siblings to petition the court for visitation 
(Washington, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Utah)15 
Unfortunately many of these proposals are never enacted.  For example, 
in 1993 legislators in California proposed a bill that would require visitation for all 
siblings separated as a result of child abuse or neglect.  It stated, “the Legislature 
declares that it is the policy of the State of California that it is in the best interest 
of these children that they have regular and frequent visitation with their 
siblings.”16 However, when a fiscal analysis was done on the bill, the legislators 
determined that such a measure would cost $9,000,000 to administer annually.  
After that analysis, the bill was changed so that such visits were only required if 
they would not cost the state any money.17 
As mentioned in the introduction, the FAACWA, is the federal law that 
governs adoptions and states must comply or risk the loss of federal funds.  This 
law has a negative impact on siblings’ rights.  The law is based on the goal of 
permanent and stable placement of children, therefore states have dramatically 
shortened the amount of time within which families may be reunified prior to the 
severance of parental rights.18  Additionally, adoption is the preferred model of 
stable custody for children separated from their biological parents.  Because of 
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this policy, sibling groups are often split up, as it is more difficult to find adoptive 
families for groups of children.19   
Federal and state case law on this matter typically varies on the types of 
decisions issued in these cases.  The Supreme Court recently declined to decide 
whether siblings have the right to associate.  In the Adoption of Hugo, a four-
year-old boy with special needs was living as a foster child in the home of the 
woman who had already adopted his older sister.  The foster mother was 
interested in adopting Hugo after caring for him for two years, however the 
juvenile court judge ordered that Hugo’s paternal aunt, who had previously raised 
a special needs child, be granted custody.20  The trial court found that Hugo had 
bonded with his sister as well as his foster mother, however they noted that this 
bond was only one factor to be considered in the best interests of the child 
consideration.21  The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling and rejected the argument that sibling association is a fundamental liberty 
interest.  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.22 
On the other hand, in Rivera v. Marcus, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the State of Connecticut violated the due 
process rights of Rivera when the state removed her half-brother and half-sister 
from her home without explanation, and placed them in a foster home.23  Rivera 
was subsequently denied visitation with her siblings and was not even told where 
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21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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or with whom they were residing.24  The court stated that Rivera “possessed an 
important liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability of her family.” 
They also held that her due process rights had been violated by the removal of 
her siblings and that the two children possessed a “liberty interest in maintaining, 
free from arbitrary state interference, the family environment that they had known 
since birth.”25 Clearly this court assigned constitutional protection to a sibling 
relationship. 
In contrast, the court in Black v. Beame, the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held that there is no constitutional obligation 
on the part of the state to “insure a given type of family life.”26  This case involved 
a sibling group of fifteen.  Four of the siblings were placed in foster care 
voluntarily by their mother.  The eleven children remaining in the home brought 
suit against the State of New York under § 1983 for failure to provide them with 
aide sufficient to keep their family together.27 They asserted that it was the duty 
of the state to provide the family with the services that they needed in order to 
keep their large family together. The court held that the state did not owe the 
Blacks a statutory and constitutional responsibility to supply the children with 
services that would ensure that they could be kept together.28  
In one interesting and noteworthy case, a New York family court took the 
issue of sibling bonding into consideration when making their decision regarding 
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1977). 
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an adoption.  In In re Adoption of Anthony,29the court implied that it would not 
have been able to grant the adoption petition without including a visitation 
provision for Anthony’s natural siblings, since Anthony’s best interests called for 
continued contact with them.  Adoption statutes did not authorize the court to 
provide for post-adoption visitation, but the court relied on its equity power to do 
so, and was subsequently able to grant the adoption.30 
These cases demonstrate the haphazard why in which issues of sibling 
separation are handled.  Each court is given the discretion to weigh the issue of 
sibling attachment as they see fit.  There are no constitutional guarantees that 
siblings will be able to remain together. 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
In light of the conflicting decisions made by courts around the nation, it is 
clear that the Supreme Court needs to recognize the rights of siblings.  Statutes 
that attempt to protect this relationship are inadequate and frequently discarded 
when it is determined that such plans are too expensive.  Thus it is left to the 
Supreme Court to recognize the existence of a fundamental right to a sibling 
relationship.  To do so would not be in conflict with past Supreme Court 
decisions.  31 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees32 the Supreme Court stated that the 
Bill of Rights offers certain “highly personal relationships a substantial measure 
                                                          
29 113 Misc.2d 26, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1982). 
30 Judy Nathan, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child. 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 633 
(1984). 
31 Barbara Jones, Do Children Posses Constitutional Rights? 78 Cornell L. Rev. at  1208 (1993) 
32 468 U.S. 609 (1984) 
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of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.”33 They held that family 
relationships receive protection under the Bill of Rights because, “family 
relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the 
necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special 
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctively personal 
aspects of one’s life.”34 Clearly, the relationship between siblings falls within this 
description of family life.  What is more, even non-biologically related step-
siblings and adoptive siblings fit within this definition.  Hence, under the Roberts 
court’s analysis of an intimate human relationship, the Constitution should protect 
siblings from undue state intrusion.35 
Another Supreme Court case, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,36 
provides a three part analysis of “family” that is protected from state interference 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The three guidelines 
set forth by the Court in this case in order to define the breadth of familial 
relationships protected by the Due Process Clause are: 1) the existence of a 
biological relationship, 2) the existence of emotional attachments derived from 
the intimacy of daily association, and 3) the origin of the relationship as entirely 
apart from the power of the State.37  Again, this analysis can easily be applied to 
the sibling relationship; siblings share a biological relationship, most siblings 
share emotional bonds stemming from daily interactions, and they are family 
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members by birth and not state decree.38  Therefore, under the analysis of this 
court, siblings should be protected by the Due Process Clause.39 
Even if the Supreme Court does find that siblings have Constitutional 
rights within the Fourteenth Amendment, it must next find that this right rises to 
the level of a fundamental right.  The concept of what defines a fundamental right 
is somewhat unclear, yet to classify a right as “fundamental” is to bestow upon it 
great power.40 The Supreme Court gives fundamental rights extreme deference 
and protection against state interference.  To interfere with a fundamental right, a 
state must have a compelling governmental interest and it must use narrow 
tailoring to achieve its objective.  Usually, the judiciary creates fundamental 
rights, although the Constitution does not specifically mention very many rights.  
 The Supreme Court has proclaimed that First Amendment rights, the right 
to vote, the right to privacy or personal autonomy, and the right to travel between 
states are fundamental rights.  Additionally, they have defended fundamental 
rights in the areas of family relations and privacy by relying on substantive due 
process analysis rather than on specific, enumerated constitutional guarantees.41   
When defining previously undefined fundamental rights, the Supreme 
Court typically relies on history and natural law, as well as on similarity to a 
previously recognized fundamental right.  Under these principles, the Supreme 
Court should recognize that siblings’ rights are fundamental because they 
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naturally share emotional bonds and affection.42 Also, siblings have a tradition 
and history as family, that the Supreme Court has deemed “a relation as old and 
fundamental as our entire civilization.”43 
Another argument in support of siblings’ rights as fundamental rights 
stems from the preexisting fundamental right to family privacy.  Because the 
court has already recognized fundamental rights in the family context such as the 
freedom of personal choice and marriage, they should find that sibling 
relationships deserve that same protection.   
Although siblings’ rights have been discussed in the federal and state 
courts, there is no clear consensus as to what rights siblings have and if they are 
afforded any constitutional protection.  Some state and federal courts have 
issued opinions that seem to give constitutional rights to siblings, while others 
have not.   
Perhaps the most telling decision on the topic of parental rights and 
visitation is the 2000 Supreme Court case, Troxel v. Granville.44  In this case, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Washington Supreme Court, which struck down 
Washington’s rather liberal visitation statute.  Washington rev. code 
§26.10.160(3) permits "[a]ny person" to petition for visitation rights "at any time" 
and authorizes state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may 
serve a child's best interest.  Petitioners Troxel petitioned for the right to visit their 
deceased son's daughters.  Respondent Granville, the girls' mother, did not 
oppose all visitation, but objected to the amount sought by the Troxels.  The 
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superior court ordered more visitation than Granville desired, and she appealed.  
The state court of appeals reversed and dismissed the Troxels' petition.  In 
affirming, the state supreme court held, inter alia, that §26.10.160(3) 
unconstitutionally infringes on parents' fundamental right to rear their children. 
They reasoned that the federal constitution permits a state to interfere with 
this right only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child, it found that 
§26.10.160(3) does not require a threshold showing of harm and sweeps too 
broadly by permitting any person to petition at any time with the only requirement 
being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child.45  Although this 
decision does not directly reflect on the issue of siblings rights, it does seem as 
though the Supreme Court would require a showing of harm before a child could 
petition a court to visit a sibling.  Without a decision on point, it is difficult to 
predict exactly how the Supreme Court might rule on the issue of sibling 
visitation. Government limits parental freedom in many ways that affect children's 
welfare in the absence of specific harm, including the power to require 
vaccinations, to control school attendance, to prohibit child labor, and to require 
the use of seatbelts and car seats.   
Perhaps the Supreme Court in the future will not view sibling visitation as 
a severe restriction on the right of parents to control the upbringing of their 
children. Instead, they might classify visitation as only a slight burden on that 
right -- one that ranks far below taking a child away from a dangerous home, or 
awarding custody to one parent or another.  Because this is only a slight burden 
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on parental autonomy, constitutional law doctrine dictates only that the state 
justify it with a "rational" reason.  Preserving the right of children to maintain 
strong bonds with siblings easily qualifies as such a reason, making sibling 
visitation statutes constitutional under this standard.46 
Given the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, it's likely that parents will 
attempt to challenge the laws in states with statutes like these. And, given the 
breakdown of votes on the Supreme Court, the Court may come to a different 
conclusion in the future.47 
ROLE OF SOCIAL WORKERS, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 
 In consideration of the fact that the Supreme Court has recently rejected 
an opportunity to make a ruling on siblings’ rights in Hugo, it seems unlikely that 
the Court will issue an opinion on this issue in the near future.  However, siblings 
are still being separated from each other within the foster care system and by 
adoption daily.  This leaves social workers, lawyers, and advocates for children’s 
rights to try and resolve this important issue within the existing legal framework 
and by creating a new framework.  
 The first step that must be taken is to reject the notion that adoption in its 
traditional form is the best solution following termination of parental rights.  Most 
current adoption laws are based on the adoption model of the mid-twentieth 
century.  This was a time in America when most adoptions that came to the 
attention of the state, were of Caucasian infants by infertile couples.  Most of the 
infants were born to unwed, young mothers.  At that time in history, there was a 
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great deal of shame and stigma attached to infertility and illegitimacy.  The 
complete severance of the child from the birth family provided protection for both 
families from the social disapproval associated with the whole process.48  
Today, adoption looks much different.  Although there have been changes 
to adoption laws, many are still based on the old notion that allows the adoptive 
family to sever all ties with members of the child’s original birth family.  However, 
demographics and social changes have made the majority children available for 
adoption older, non-white, sibling groups, many with special needs.   
Therefore, the concept of the “traditional” adoptive home should not be the 
favored option for all of these children.  For example, in Los Angeles County in 
1989 there were 30,000 children in out-of-home placements under the jurisdiction 
of the Juvenile Court.  However, fewer than 4% were placed in adoptive homes.49  
Currently, in order to receive federal funding, states must have adoption as their 
permanent goal.  States lose funding if children are left in indeterminate 
placements; therefore, the decision to place children in adoptive homes actually 
has more to do with financial interests of the state than with the best interests of 
the individual child.50   
This presumption of adoption results in lower self-esteem among hard to 
place children.  It also devalues long term guardians or foster parents, when in 
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fact, they may be the best providers for the children under the circumstances.51    
Caseworkers are forced to consider that the “best interests” of the child means a 
traditional adoption into a family of strangers, when in fact other options may 
provide the child with more stability and allow them to remain within his or her 
kinship network of origin.52  Lobbyists for children’s rights must work with 
legislators so that federal law does not require adoption in all situations, 
particularly when siblings are involved.   
  
Social workers may be able to affect the outcome of sibling placement 
simply by doing all they can to place sibling groups together upon entering the 
foster care system.  The longer that siblings remain in different placements, the 
greater the likelihood that they will never be reunited, on the other hand, most 
siblings that are initially placed together stay together permanently.53 
Furthermore, social service agencies can encourage kinship care.  In the 
United States, prior to World War II, there was not a great demand for children to 
adopt.  Although some children were placed in orphanages, relatives took in 
most orphans or children whose parents could no longer care for them.  This 
allowed children to maintain sibling bonds, as well as bonds to other members of 
their extended families.  There is a current trend to return to this concept.  From 
1988 to 1995 kinship foster care increased by forty percent.54  Children placed 
with relatives experience less foster care drift, and relatives are more willing to 
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53 See id. at 1 
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keep large groups of siblings together than are non-relative foster parents.  The 
stability and the ability to keep siblings together are positive aspects of kinship 
care.55 Social workers should explore all such kinship options thoroughly before 
separating siblings into different foster homes.  
Alternatively, children who are separated by the system need to be able to 
have frequent and lengthy visits with their siblings as well as telephone access 
so that they maintain some bond.  Historically, once children have been adopted, 
their new parents are given complete control over their lives.  If the new parents 
do not want the child to maintain any contact with siblings or other biological 
relatives, that is their right.  This policy ignores the rights of the child being 
adopted, and it also ignores the rights of the siblings who have not been adopted 
to see and maintain a connection with a blood relative.  Social workers must be 
vigilant in making sure that foster parents allow children to contact their siblings if 
they are placed in other foster homes.   
Lawyers for these children need to insist that they be allowed to maintain 
contact with their siblings.  Some states have gone so far as to make sibling 
contact a variable in adoption placement, favoring a potential adoptive family that 
promises to continue sibling visitations over one that does not.56  West Virginia 
even requires that any party who opposes post-adoption sibling visitation must 
offer clear and convincing evidence of why such visits should not occur.57 
                                                                                                                                                                             
54 Id. at 27 
55 Id. at 28 
56 William Wesley Patton, The Status of Siblings’ Rights: A View into the New Millennium, 51 
DePaul L. Rev. at 27 
57 Id. 
 17 
Another step that lobbyists can take is to advocate a sibling visitation 
rights statute such as the one proposed by Williams (see Appendix I). Such a 
statute would ensure that siblings could petition the court to visit one another as 
long as such visitation was not harmful.  Presently, without such statutes, most 
courts would rule that one sibling does not have standing to petition the court for 
visitation of another sibling.  There are currently excellent models for such 
legislation found in all fifty states: grandparent visitation statutes.  It is noteworthy 
that both courts and legislatures have been willing to step in and grant visitation 
rights to grandparents, even in cases where it is against the wishes of parents 
(adoptive and natural).  Even before this legislation was passed, courts relied on 
the “best interest of the child” analysis to support this visitation in the absence of 
statute.58  For example, in Weichman v. Weichman,59 a Wisconsin court found 
that grandparents had standing to petition the court to visit their grandson in 
while his father was overseas in the military despite the objections of his mother.  
The court opined that a child experiencing the trauma of divorce should have 
their rights to extended family bonds strengthened by the court.60   
Curiously, courts do not extend this reasoning to visitation by siblings 
following an adoption.  Perhaps this is because siblings in these situations are 
typically minors, who are perceived by the courts as being less able to make 
decisions concerning what is in their own best interests.61  Probably the most 
compelling reason for this discrepancy is the fact that grandparents typically have 
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the monetary and political resources to support a campaign to help them gain 
these rights.62  Children, and young adults, on the other hand, have little political 
clout and typically have even fewer resources.  Additionally, courts may tend to 
view youngsters as troublemakers and afford them less respect than 
grandparents, whom they assume have the best interests of the child at heart.63  
 Ironically, the very statutes that expand the rights of grandparents, and 
occasionally other adult family members, have actually been used against 
siblings seeking visitation.  In the case of Lihs v. Lihs, the Iowa Supreme Court 
refused to grant judicial access to siblings because of the Iowa state statute that 
specifically mentioned grandparent visitation, but remained silent on the issue of 
sibling visitation.64  
Many questions arise out of a proposal to statutorily grant siblings access 
to one another after adoption.  First, there may be concerns about granting 
children too much power, particularly over adults.  Second, there may be 
constitutional issues arising from a parent’s constitutional right to raise their child 
as they see fit.  Third, will a law such as this actually be an effective way of 
ensuring that siblings can maintain a relationship prior to separation by adoption. 
First, legislatures and courts are very reluctant to take action that might 
disrupt parental authority.  Concerns about a slippery slope might arise; if 
children can sue to visit siblings, what is to stop them from suing for all sorts of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
61 Ellen Marrus, “Where Have You Been Fran?” The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access to 
Override Parental Denial of Visitation. 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 977 at 1008 (1999). 
62 See id. at 1008. 
63 See id. at 1014. 
64 504 N.W.2d 890 (Iowa 1993). 
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other rights like more allowance or extra ice cream?65  Clearly we cannot have 
our court dockets cluttered with such frivolous issues.  In response to these 
concerns, one should note that most children do not have the financial resources 
or the knowledge to bring such a suit.  A statute allowing for sibling visitation 
does not mean that children will become the legal equals of adults.  Merely giving 
children access to the courts does not even guarantee that visitation will 
automatically be granted.  Giving children standing only allows their cases to get 
to the fact-finding stage.  At that point a judge may weigh all of the evidence and 
find that sibling visitation is not in the best interest of one or both of the siblings, 
and may deny visitation.66  Just as with the grandparents rights statutes, judges 
will retain their broad discretion, and will have the power to keep a sibling 
visitation statute from falling down a “slippery slope.”  
Second, the issue of parental Constitutional rights arises.  Adoptive 
parents may argue that they have a fundamental right to raise their children free 
from governmental interference.  In circumstances where a statute infringes on a 
fundamental right, the state must prove that they have a compelling 
governmental interest.  Here, the protection of the sibling relationship, which is 
important to a child’s mental and emotional well-being, could satisfy that interest.  
If courts and legislatures are willing to usurp parental rights in favor of 
grandparents, it only makes sense that the same judicial access should be 
                                                          
65 See id. at 1015 
66 See id. at 1017 
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extended to siblings.  This is especially so, since siblings are more likely than 
grandparents to have a relationship that involves daily intimate contact.67 
Third, the effectiveness of a statute such as this is questionable.  Can 
such a statute truly help siblings to maintain a bond after adoption?  With the 
implementation of such a statute this remains to be seen.  As mentioned above, 
children rarely have the financial resources or the legal expertise to successfully 
bring such a petition.  For such a statute to be effective, child advocates, social 
workers, and those dedicated to providing legal services to those lacking in 
resources would have to make a dedicated effort to helping children take 
advantage of such a law.  On the other hand, such a statute may have some 
indirect side effects that could be beneficial for siblings.  Knowing that such an 
option existed for siblings could make adoptive parents more likely to be flexible 
in granting visitation.  Additionally, a new law such as this could generate public 
attention to the issue of siblings and adoption and could result in more adoptive 
parents willing to adopt siblings as a group.  Although the provisions of a sibling 
visitation statute would not rise to the level of fundamental Constitutional rights 
for siblings, such laws would be a step in the right direction.  
Another tactic that lawyers can use to help keep siblings together is to 
remind judges that judges can rely more on their powers of equity and make less 
formalistic decisions when it comes to siblings, much like the above mentioned 
New York court in In re the adoption of Anthony.  Formalism is the notion that 
statute or law should be strictly adhered to, without any room for judicial 
discretion.  Justice Scalia, a major proponent of formalism explains formalism as 
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a theoretical formula that must be universally applied.  Deviation from this 
formula is not allowed, regardless of the circumstances.  Scalia warns that 
without formalism, there will be no uniform application of the laws and the justice 
system will become unpredictable.68 
Perhaps formalism is an appropriate perspective when dealing with areas 
of the law that lend themselves more readily to mathematical formulas; such as 
tax.  However, in the area of domestic relations, particularly relating to child 
custody, there are simply too many variables to be able to apply formalism.  The 
Indiana Court of Appeals stated, “When the judicial system becomes involved in 
family matters concerning relationships between parent and child, simplistic 
analysis and the strict application of absolute legal principles should be 
avoided.”69  In cases where judges must decide what is in the “best interest” of 
the child, there is a great deal of discretion.  In L. v. G. the New Jersey Supreme 
Court found that children “possessed the natural, inherent and inalienable right to 
visit with each other.”70 In this case the adult children in the family sought 
visitation with their minor siblings and their father and stepmother contested.  The 
court held that parents opposition should never be the reason why sibling 
visitation is not granted.  They considered the best interests of the children, and 
not of the parents.71  More courts should abandon the notion of formalism when it 
comes to decisions regarding siblings.  They should use their discretion based on 
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what is in the best interest of the child to make decisions that truly benefit 
siblings.  
CONCLUSION 
 All children need to grow up in a stable, nurturing environment so that they 
may grow up to be functioning, contributing members of society.  When children 
are deprived of family, and their attachments are severed, they grow up without 
learning how to form human bonds.  This deficit severely and negatively impacts 
the way in which they live the rest of their lives and also the way they fit in to 
society.  When parental rights must be terminated, children are traumatized, 
there is no way to change that, however, children are further traumatized when 
their siblings are also removed from their lives.   This trauma is often 
unnecessary and probably costs society more in the long run, than keeping 
siblings together.  Since it seems that the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant 
siblings any sort of fundamental Constitutional right from state interference in 
their right to associate, it is left to the family court judges, lawyers, social workers 
and child advocates to try and keep these children together.  Through the 
implementation of new laws, administrative procedures and policies, and a less 
formalistic approach to judicial decision-making society has the potential to make 
great strides in the lives of siblings who may otherwise have suffered. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
MODEL SIBLING VISITATION RIGHTS STATUTE 
Joel V. Williams, Sibling Rights to Visitation: A Relationship Too Valuable to be 
Denied, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 259, 296 (1995) 
 
(1) Standing to Petition for Access and Basis for Decision 
Where circumstances show that conditions exist in which equity would see fit 
to intervene, the (specific) courts of this state, on petition from any person 
who is a brother or sister regardless of degree of blood relationship or, if the 
person is a minor, upon petition by a parent, guardian, or proper person in 
behalf of the minor, may grant by order, reasonable visitation rights to the 
petitioner so as to allow the petitioner the right to visit any brother or sister, 
regardless of the degree of blood relationship, if the court finds that the 
applicant ahs proved by a preponderance of the evidence that granting 
visitation would be in the best interests of the child to be visited. 
 
(2) Factors for Consideration 
In making a determination whether visitation is in the best interests of the 
child to be visited, on an application filed pursuant to this section, the court 
shall consider the following factors: 
(a) The relationship between the child and the applicant; 
(b) The relationship between each of the child’s parents or the person with 
whom the child is residing and the applicant; 
(c) The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the 
child and the child’s parents or the person with whom the child is residing 
and the willingness and ability of the party seeking visitation to facilitate 
and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and 
the parent or parents; 
(d) The time elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant; 
(e) If the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement 
which exists between the parents with regard to the child; 
(f) Any history of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or neglect by the 
applicant; 
(g) The moral fitness of the party seeking visitation; 
(h) The mental and physical health of the party seeking visitation; 
(i) The good faith of the applicant in fling the application; 
(j) The medical and other needs of the child related to health as affected by 
visitation; 
(k) The reasonable preference of the child, if the child has a preference, and if 
the child is determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a preference; 
and 
(l) Any other factor relevant to the best interests of the child. 
 
(3) Procedural Considerations 
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(a) This statute shall pertain to all children, even those children in state 
custody. 
(b) If the parental rights of either or both natural parents of a child are 
relinquished or terminated, and the child is placed in the custody of a 
public agency or a private agency licensed to place children in homes, the 
district court in the county in which the child resides may grant to the 
children of either parent a reasonable right to visit their siblings during his 
minority, regardless of whether the petition is filed with the court before the 
date on which the parental rights are relinquished or terminated.  In 
determining whether to grant this right to a petitioner, the court must find 
that the visits would be in the best interests of the child in light of the 
considerations set forth in subsection (2). 
(c) The Court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights 
whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child. 
(d) If any court has entered an order prohibiting a non-custodial parent of a 
child from any contact with a child or restricting the non-custodial parent’s 
contact with the child, the following provision shall apply: 
If the sibling who ahs been granted visitation privileges under this order 
uses the visitation privileges to facilitate contact between the child and the 
child’s non-custodial parents, the visitation privileges granted under this 
order shall be permanently revoked. 
(e) No sibling of any minor child, regardless of blood relationship, convicted of 
any offense involving an illegal sex act perpetrated upon any victim, but 
not limited to offenses of the applicable statutes of this state, will be 
entitled to visitation rights while on parole or a mandatory supervised 
release for that offense.  Upon discharge from parole or mandatory 
supervised release, visitation shall be denied until said person 
successfully completes a treatment program approved by the court, and 
the court determines that such individual should be granted visitation. 
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